A typical strategy for dealing with commodity surpluses is to store them for future sale; though electricity cannot yet be stored on a large scale, this storage strategy will become a natural choice for dealing with electricity surpluses. However, because electricity prices can be negative, there exists another potential strategy: To buy electricity surpluses at negative prices and dispose of them. While at first it may seem counterintuitive to derive profits from destroying electricity, it has never been established whether a storage strategy or a disposal strategy would be more valuable for a merchant who trades electricity in a market.
Introduction
In a commodity market, surpluses occur when supply outstrips demand. Dealing with surpluses in electricity markets is critical because electricity supply and demand must be matched in real time to ensure the integrity of the electrical grid. As storing surpluses for future resale is the most common strategy for other commodities (Williams and Wright 1991) , it is also a natural one for The average real-time price of every eight hours from 2005 -2008 recognized the potential of this strategy.
Another possible strategy for dealing with electricity surpluses is to destroy them. This counterintuitive strategy is potentially appealing because of the existence of negative electricity prices, or, equivalently, periods in which buyers are paid to purchase electricity. For instance, Figure 1 plots the average price of eight hour blocks in the real-time market of New York City (run by the New York Independent System Operator; NYISO) from 2005 to 2008: there were fourteen periods of negative prices, sometimes as low as −$100/MWh (megawatt hours). Negative prices have also been observed in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT 2008) , the Nordic Power Exchange (Sewalt and de Jong 2007) , the European Energy Exchange (Genoese et al. 2010 , Nicolosi 2010 , Brandstätt et al. 2011 , and the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO 2009).
Negative prices may be caused by various factors, such as limits on the speed that conventional power plants (such as coal or nuclear power plants) can be shut down or brought online, or the high cost of doing so. As a result, when electricity demand is low, e.g., at night, owners of such plants may be willing to pay others to purchase their excess power (Knittel and Roberts 2005 , Sewalt and de Jong 2007 , Genoese et al. 2010 , Nicolosi 2010 , Brandstätt et al. 2011 . In recent years, negative prices in the U.S. may also have been caused by the federal Production Tax Credit received by wind-based electricity generators (Fink et al. 2009) : because this credit is currently valued at $22/MWh (DSIRE 2011), wind generators may bid a negative price and still generate positive revenue from a sale, as long as the price is greater than -$22/MWh. With the increasing use of wind power, negative prices may become more frequent and larger in magnitude in the future (Genoese et al. 2010 , Nicolosi 2010 , Brandstätt et al. 2011 ).
It is not clear which strategy for managing electricity surpluses-storage or disposal-is more valuable for a merchant. We investigate this question by modeling a storage facility at different round-trip efficiencies, the ratio of the quantity of electricity withdrawn to that stored (EPRI 2004 ). This efficiency depends on the specific storage technology, ranging from 95% for a lithiumion battery to 45% for a metal air battery (see more examples in §5). By varying this efficiency, our model encompasses both the case when electricity surpluses are stored (high efficiency) and the case when they are destroyed (low efficiency, as the majority of the electricity is lost during the conversion process). We focus on modeling industrial batteries, an important type of electricity storage. However, our model may be modified to represent other storage facilities, such as compressed-air energy storage and pumped-hydro storage (EPRI 2004 , Economist 2012 .
We model this problem of managing a storage facility with prices that are potentially negative as a Markov decision process (MDP). The round-trip efficiency and the physical constraint on the energy capacity of the storage facility make our electricity storage problem similar to that of other commodities, such as natural gas or oil. However, our problem differs from these problems due to the existence of negative prices; there is no known optimal policy structure for this case in the literature. Therefore, we derive our model's optimal policy: We show that for every stage and price state, the initial inventory set can be divided into three regions, one region in which it is optimal to empty the facility, one in which it is optimal to fill up the facility, and one in which it is optimal to do nothing.
Our policy structure differs from typical threshold policy structures in the literature in that: (1) the optimal ending inventory may not be monotonically increasing in the starting inventory level; that is, a high starting inventory level may lead to a low ending inventory level (and vice versa);
and (2) the optimal action may bring initial inventory farther from a "target" band delineated by two thresholds if it is already outside of the band. In addition, our policy structure subsumes the optimal policy structure for managing storage in Charnes et al. (1966) ; when price can only be positive, our policy simplifies to theirs. This structure facilitates computing the values of the storage and disposal strategies in our numerical study.
We compare the values of the storage and disposal strategies using a financial engineering model of electricity price calibrated to NYISO historical price data presented in Zhou et al. (2013) . We vary the round-trip efficiency of the storage facility over a range of values that includes both low and high efficiency, to model both the disposal and storage strategies. Our numerical results indicate that the disposal strategy can be more valuable than the storage strategy for an electricity merchant. They also show that the value of the storage strategy originates from storing electricity purchased mainly at low but positive prices for resale at high positive prices. This is in contrast to the disposal strategy, whose value arises from destroying surpluses purchased at negative prices.
We also show that if negative prices are ignored the value of the disposal strategy may decrease significantly, while the value of the storage strategy barely changes.
While these findings are potentially relevant to electricity merchants, they may also help policy makers assess the potential impact of the disposal and storage strategies on social welfare.
Specifically, our results suggest that uncoordinated margin maximization may induce merchants to dispose of electricity instead of storing it, as public policy may prefer. This implies that government policies aimed at encouraging the storage strategy may be needed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we review the extant literature in §2; we present our MDP in §3 and our structural analysis of its optimal policy in §4; we carry out our numerical analysis in §5 and conclude in §6.
Literature Review
Our work is related to the commodity and energy storage literature. A classical problem studied in this literature is the warehouse problem introduced by Cahn (1948) : given a warehouse with limited space, what is the optimal inventory trading policy given the seasonal (deterministic) variability in the commodity price? Dreyfus (1957) and Charnes et al. (1966) show that if this commodity price is positive, and stochastic in Charnes et al. (1966) , the optimal inventory trading decisions for a given time and price are the same for any inventory level: either fill up the warehouse, empty it, or do nothing. The warehouse in our paper is an electricity storage facility.
Rempala (1994) imposes a limit on the rate at which the inventory can be increased, and shows the optimality of a threshold-type policy. Secomandi (2010) extends the model of Charnes et al. (1966) to include both upward and downward inventory adjustment capacities and establishes that a threshold type policy is optimal. Kaminski et al. (2008) find that the optimality of a similar policy structure also holds for a continuous time version of the problem. Devalkar et al. (2011) consider the case of a commodity processor that has procurement and processing capacity constraints and can convert a single input commodity into multiple output commodities. These authors prove the optimality of a threshold-type policy. Other related work can be found in the literature on commodity and energy real options (see, e.g., McCardle 1999, Geman 2005) , including Chen and Forsyth (2007) , Boogert and de Jong (2008) , Thompson et al. (2009 ), Lai et al. (2010a , Wu et al. (2012) . All of these papers assume that the commodity price is positive.
We show that the presence of negative prices can dramatically alter the optimal policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966) : for a given time and commodity price, different types of actions can be optimal at different inventory levels. In addition, the presence of negative prices causes our policy structure to differ from that of standard threshold policies (Charnes et al. 1966 , Rempala 1994 , Secomandi 2010 ) because, for a given time and commodity price, (i) in our model it can be optimal to fully charge the storage facility at low inventory levels and fully discharge it at high inventory levels-in contrast to the monotonicity of the optimal ending inventory levels in these standard threshold structures; and (ii) while common threshold policies bring inventory close to a band enclosed by two thresholds, our optimal policy may bring inventory further away from such a band if it is already outside of the band.
Most of the extant literature on electricity storage assumes perfect information on future electricity prices, including Graves et al. (1999) , Figueiredo et al. (2006) , Walawalkar et al. (2007) ,
and Sioshansi et al. (2009) . These authors assume that one has the ability to foresee future prices, and find the optimal policy for a given price path by solving a linear programming problem. In contrast, we model prices as a stochastic process, and derive the optimal policy in the face of price uncertainty. Two papers on electricity storage that do model price uncertainty are Mokrian and Stephen (2006) and Xi et al. (2011) : Mokrian and Stephen (2006) assess the value of different electricity storage facilities in an electricity market; Xi et al. (2011) co-optimize multiple usages of storage, including energy usage and backup service. However, neither of these papers considers the case when price can be negative, nor do they derive the optimal policy structure.
Our paper is also related to the work of Zhou et al. (2013) . These authors also consider the possibility of negative electricity prices. However, we focus on quantifying the relative values of the storage strategy and the disposal strategy to deal with electricity surpluses, while they consider jointly optimizing wind-based electricity generation with storage. Similar to these authors, we observe that ignoring negative prices in managing a storage facility with a high round-trip efficiency yields only a small loss in value.
Model
We consider a merchant's problem of managing electricity storage in a real-time electricity wholesale market. (Consistent with the literature on valuing electricity storage, e.g., Walawalkar et al. (2007) , Sioshansi et al. (2009 ), Hittinger et al. (2010 , we do not consider bidding in a forward market.) We assume that the merchant is a price taker, and thus his trading decisions do not affect the market price. The merchant trades electricity in a finite horizon at each period t from a set T : = {1, · · · , T };
at the terminal period T + 1, any electricity left is worthless.
The source of uncertainty in our model is the evolution of electricity price. Let p t be a vector of n factors with support P t ⊆ R n , and let p t ($/MWh) be the sum of all components in p t . Our analysis in this section and the next is independent of any specific price model, except for the requirement that prices be Markovian and not affected by the merchant's decisions. We defer discussion of a specific choice of a price model to §5, where one is used in our numerical analysis. At the beginning of every period t ∈ T , the merchant knows the price vector of the current period, p t , which gives the conditional probability distribution of the price vector in the next period, p t+1 .
The merchant's storage facility is finite in energy capacity; without loss of generality, we normalize the available energy capacity to be one (MWh). We use the standard definition of energy capacity, which is "the maximum amount of energy that the system can deliver to the load without being recharged" (Eyer and Corey 2010) . The storage facility's round-trip efficiency equals α · β · η, where α, β, and η (all in (0, 1]) represent the efficiency in charging, discharging, and storing over one period (storage facilities may lose electricity by self-discharging when on standby).
We denote the inventory (electricity) in the merchant's facility at the beginning of each period t by x t , where x t has the domain X := [0, 1 · η]. (The maximum inventory level is η as storage loss occurs at the end of each period; this is a reasonable assumption as η is close to one for many types of storage facilities.) The decision for each period t is denoted by a t : if a t < 0, a t is the quantity of inventory decrease due to selling, so the actual quantity sold to the market is a t multiplied by the discharging efficiency, that is a t · β; if a t ≥ 0, a t is the quantity of the inventory increase due to buying, so the actual quantity bought from the market is a t divided by the charging efficiency, that is a t /α. For any given initial inventory level x t , the feasible action set for a t is [−x t , 1 − x t ] =: Ω(x t ).
For each period t ∈ T , let R(a t , p t ) denote the immediate payoff function, which is the purchasing cost if a t ≥ 0 and the selling revenue if a t < 0, specifically
In each period t ∈ T , the sequence of events is as follows:
(i) At the beginning of period t, based on x t and p t , the merchant decides on a t .
(ii) Electricity flows either from the storage facility to the market in the case of selling (incurring a loss in discharging) or vice versa in the case of buying (incurring a loss in charging).
(iii) At the end of period t, the inventory decreases by (1−η)×100 percent, thus x t+1 = η(x t +a t ).
We formulate the merchant's problem as a finite-horizon MDP. Each stage of the MDP corresponds to one time period. The state variables in stage t are x t and p t . The objective is to maximize the total expected discounted market value of the cash flows over the horizon.
For period t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}, let V t (x t , p t ) denote the value function from period t onward given x t and p t ; if t = T + 1, the value function is
For any period t ∈ T , the value function V t (x t , p t ) is the expected sum-given p t -of the optimal immediate payoff function and the discounted resulting value function for the next period, and thus satisfies the following recursion:
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the one-period discount factor. This is a market value maximization formulation (Seppi 2002) , i.e., we use a risk-neutral probability measure, and a risk-free discount factor.
Analysis
In this section we derive the optimal policy structure of model (2). The general procedure is as follows. We first split (2) into two subproblems: one allowing only selling, and the other allowing only buying. We then find the optimal solution to each subproblem to be of a threshold structure:
for the subproblem of selling (buying), the optimal action is to sell all (do nothing) below the threshold, and to do nothing (buy and fill up) above it. Finally, we combine the two subproblems to derive the optimal solution for (2). Because either of these two thresholds can be the largest, we show how the resulting threshold structures are different from typical ones in the literature.
Define y t := η(x t + a t ) as the ending inventory level in period t, thus
. Substituting a t = y t /η − x t into (2), we obtain for every period t ∈ T V t (x t , p t ) = max
where V S t (x t , p t ) is the optimal value function attainable by selling, and V B t (x t , p t ) by buying:
Therefore, we can solve the original maximization problem in (2) by solving the two equivalent problems in (4) and (5), which after removing the constant terms reduce to
To avoid trivial cases, we make a standard assumption about price (Assumption 1). We then establish the convexity of our value functions in Proposition 1 (its proof is in Appendix A).
Proposition 1. For any t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}, it holds that |V t (x t , p t )| < ∞ and V t (x t , p t ) is convex in x t ∈ X given any p t ∈ P t .
Proposition 1 enables us to characterize the optimal solutions to (6) and (7), denoted respectively by y S * t (x t ) and y B * t (x t ), in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given t ∈ T and p t , y S * t (x t ) can be either 0 or ηx t ; y B * t (x t ) can be either ηx t or η.
Proof: Following from Proposition 1, V t+1 (y t , p t+1 ) is finite and convex in y t given any p t+1 .
any p t as expectation preserves convexity. Adding finite linear terms does not alter the finiteness and convexity, thus both objective functions in (6) and (7) are finite and convex in y t given any p t .
Therefore, the maximizers of both objective functions can occur at only their corresponding end points, that is, y
Proof: According to Lemma 1, y S * t (x t ) can be either 0 or ηx t . Since the objective function in (6) is convex in y t for any x t ∈ [0, η] (shown in the same fashion as the proof for Lemma 1), it follows that as x t increases from 0 to η, there exists one and only one inventory level (denoted by X S t ) below which y S * t (x t ) = 0 (sell down to zero), and above which y S * t (x t ) = ηx t (do nothing). We can characterize X Similarly, for (7), since the objective function in (7) is convex in y t for any x t , then as x t increases from 0 to η, there exists one and only one inventory level (denoted by X B t ) below which y B * t (x t ) = ηx t (do nothing), and above which y B * t (x t ) = η (fill up). We then define X B t as stated. The inventory level X S t splits the feasible inventory domain into two regions: a sell-all region on the left, and a do-nothing region on the right (see Figure 3) . Likewise, X B t splits the inventory domain into two regions: a do-nothing region on the left, and a fill-up region on the right (see Figure 3 ). The value of X S t can be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the value of X B t ; we characterize these properties in detail in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For each period t ∈ T : (i) both X S t and X B t change from 0 to η, as p t changes from
To prove the optimal policy structure in Proposition 2, we need the following Lemma 4 (see Appendix B for its proof).
Lemma 4. For any t ∈ T , if X S t > X B t , the graphs of V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) cross at most once over (0, η). When they do cross, either one of the following conditions holds:
Lemma 4 states that V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) have the same value at most once over the interval (0, η), excluding the ending points. The above two conditions indicate that when V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) do cross, the right end points of these two curves have a predefined ranking: one end point is always no lower than the other end point. These two conditions always hold only when V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) do cross; they do not need to hold when V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) do not cross. With Lemma 2 and 4, we can establish the optimal policy structure in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For each period t ∈ T , the feasible inventory set X can be divided into at most three non-overlapping regions: a region where it is optimal to empty the storage facility, one where it is optimal to fill up the facility, and one where it is optimal to do nothing. Specifically,
, the optimal action in stage t and state (x t , p t ) for model (2) is
(10)
Case 2: If X S t = η, X B t = 0 and p t < 0, when x t varies from 0 to η, the optimal action in stage t and state (x t , p t ) for model (2) changes from filling up to selling all the available inventory.
t except under the condition in Case 2, when x t varies from 0 to η, the optimal action in stage t and state (x t , p t ) for model (2) changes from selling all to filling up.
We will examine the optimal action in stage t and state (x t , p t ) for model (2), denoted by a * t for simplicity, in three regions separately:
, as seen from Figure 3(a) , the optimal decision for (6) is y t = 0 (to sell everything), and the optimal decision for (7) is to do nothing, which is also a feasible solution to (6). Thus, the optimal decision for (3) is y t = 0, or, equivalently, a * t = −x t . ii) Similar to i), for x t ∈ (X B t , η], the optimal decision for (7) is to fill up, while for (6) is to do nothing, which is also a feasible action for (7). Thus, the optimal decision for (3) is y t = η, or, equivalently, a * t = 1 − x t . iii) For x t ∈ [X S t , X B t ], the optimal decisions for both (6) and (7) are to do nothing. Thus, the optimal decision for (3) is to do nothing.
Case 2 and Case 3:
To find the optimal action for these two cases, the proof technique for Case 1 is not sufficient (examining the region [X B t , X S t ]). We thus use Lemma 4, which states that V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) can cross at most once over (0, η). This means that when x t varies over X the optimal action can change at most once: either from selling all to filling up, or vice versa. However, to determine the exact sequence, we need to consider the following two cases separately:
In this case, it follows from Lemma 4 that when V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) do cross, we have V S t (η, p t ) ≥ V B t (η, p t ), which means that when they cross, V S t (·, p t ) ends at a point no lower than that for V B t (·, p t ). Thus, the optimal structure can be only of the form in Figure 4(b) , that is, as x t increases, the optimal action changes from filling up to selling all. This structure includes two degenerate cases when these functions do not cross: for all x t ∈ X , the optimal action is to fill up; or for all x t ∈ X , the optimal action is to sell down to zero. Similar to Case 2, it follows from Lemma 4 that when V S t (·, p t ) and V B t (·, p t ) do cross, we have V S t (η, p t ) ≤ V B t (η, p t ); thus the optimal structure can be only of the form in Figure 4(c) , that is, as x t increase, the optimal action changes from selling all to filling up. When these functions do not cross, this structure includes the same two degenerate cases as in Case 2.
Figure 4(a) shows the optimal policy structure for Case 1: it consists of three ordered regions corresponding to the optimal actions of selling-all, doing-nothing, and filling-up, but some regions may be empty. For instance, it is possible that X S t = X B t = η, in which case the optimal decision is to sell down to zero at all initial inventory levels, i.e., all of X is a selling-all region, and the ] if it starts outside of this band. For Case 2 and 3, X is divided into two regions: selling-all and filling-up; the do-nothing region is reduced to a single point. Again one region can be empty. For Case 2, the optimal ending inventory is not monotonically increasing in the initial inventory level, unlike that of Charnes et al. (1966) , Rempala (1994) , and Secomandi (2010).
Lemma 3 complements Proposition 2 in illustrating the price regions for which the optimal policy structure of Case 1, 2 and 3 would occur: if p t < 0, the optimal structure can be either Figure 4( b) or (c); when p t ≥ 0, the optimal structure can be either Figure 4 (a) or (c).
We next examine how V t (x t , p t ) changes with α in Proposition 3 (see its proof in Appendix D).
Proposition 3. If there exists a period t ∈ T such that, given p 1 , there is a strictly positive probability that p t is negative, then there exists a charging efficiencyᾱ < 1 such that V 1 (x 1 , p 1 ) corresponding toᾱ is greater than V 1 (x 1 , p 1 ) corresponding to α = 1. Proposition 3 can be interpreted as follows: if the period 1 conditional distribution of the spot price at some future time admits negative prices with a strictly positive probability, then one can find a sufficiently smallᾱ such that the value function corresponding to this value ofᾱ is greater than the value function corresponding to α = 1. We will explore this result numerically in §5, where we use a sufficiently low value of α to denote the disposal strategy and α = 1 to denote the storage strategy (given β = 1 and η = 1).
We have shown that the three patterns in Figure 4 characterize the optimal policy structure of our MDP. This structure generalizes the optimal structure established by Charnes et al. (1966) when the commodity price can be only positive: In this case the optimal action in a given stage Figure 5 Optimal policy structure by Charnes et al. (1966) when prices are positive.
and state is the same for all inventory levels: either do nothing, fill up the facility, or empty it, as in Figure 5 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. Each pattern in Figure 5 is a special case of a pattern in Figure 4 . Note that the optimal ending inventory levels in the structure of Charnes et al. (1966) are increasing in inventory; however, this is not always true in our structure (see Figure 4 (b)).
Mathematically, this difference is due to the linearity in inventory of the value functions in the model of Charnes et al. (1966) , and the convexity in inventory of the value functions in our model, as shown in Proposition 1. This disparity in value functions is remarkable, as the value functions of other storage models (e.g., Secomandi 2010) are concave rather than convex in inventory.
Next we demonstrate using examples how negative prices together with a round-trip efficiency less than one give rise to this convexity in inventory, and how the convexity leads to policy structures Example 1. For simplicity, we assume no loss in charging or storing over time (α = η = 1).
However, half of the electricity will be lost in discharging (β = 0.5). The time horizon consists of three periods, thus T = 3; their prices are deterministic and equal to −4, −3, and 0 respectively.
The value function for the second period is (the price argument is obvious and thus omitted)
The value function for the first period is
where 1(·) is an indicator function: one if the inequalities in the parenthesis are satisfied; zero otherwise. The optimal value function and optimal ending inventory level in stage 1 for Example 1.
Thus V 1 (x 1 ) is convex in x 1 (Figure 6 , left). The optimal inventory decision is to fill up the storage facility when x 1 is less than a half, and to sell all the available inventory otherwise ( Figure   6 , right), which is an example of the structure in Figure 4 (8) and (9) in Lemma 2.
The intuition for Example 1 is as follows: Since the price trajectory is −4, −3, 0, filling up the storage facility in period 1 is always better than filling it up in period 2, and in period 2 selling any inventory level is never optimal. The only issue is then whether it may be optimal to empty the storage facility in period 1 and to fill it up in period 2, rather than filling it up in period 1 and doing nothing in period 2. The payoff of the first strategy is 3 − 2x 1 ; the payoff of the second strategy is 4 − 4x 1 . The first strategy is better than the second one if and only if 3 − 2x 1 > 4 − 4x 1 , that is, x 1 > 0.5. This means that in period 1 it is optimal to empty when the inventory level exceeds 0.5, and it is optimal to fill up when the inventory level is less than or equal to 0.5. This illustrates how an efficiency loss (in this example 50% for discharging) combined with negative prices can induce a nontrivial relationship between inventory and an optimal action; that is, emptying the storage facility at high inventory levels (above 0.5) and filling it up at low inventory levels (at or below 0.5).
Example 2. This example has the same efficiency as Example 1, but it has four periods. In the first period, the price is deterministic: 4; the price of the last three periods is stochastic, with equal probability to be either of the following three paths: (−12, −10.8, 0), (−12, −7.2, 0), or (54, 0, 0). Figure 7 The optimal ending inventory level in stage 1 for Example 2 (left) and Example 3 (right).
Using the same method in Example 1, we can compute-for each of the three price paths-the value function of the second stage. We then combine these three price paths to obtain the expected value function for stage two, which is the continuation valuation function for stage 1. Similarly, we compute the value function for stage 1 and its optimal ending inventory level versus the starting inventory level, which we plot in Figure 7 (left). (Detailed derivation is available upon request.) This demonstrates an example of the optimal structure in Figure 4 (a), where X S 1 = 0.4, and X B 1 = 0.6. In Example 2, the optimal action in period 1 is to sell all at low inventory levels, and fill up at high inventory levels. The policy does this in anticipation of the optimal policy in period 2: filling up at low inventory levels, and selling all at high inventory levels. This policy is optimal in period 2 because i) similar to Example 1, for the two paths of (−12, −10.8, 0) and (−12, −7.2, 0), it is optimal to fill up at low inventory levels, and sell all at high inventory levels (in period 2); and ii) the optimal action for these two paths at low inventory levels dominates that for the last path (54, 0, 0). The optimal actions at these two paths coincide with that of the path (54, 0, 0) at high inventory levels.
Example 3. This example is the same as Example 2 except that the price for the first period is 3.2. As a result, the optimal policy contains only two actions: selling all below x 1 = 1/8; filling up above x 1 = 1/8 (Figure 7, right) . In this case, X S 1 = 2/7, greater than X B 1 = 1/11. (The intuition for this example is similar to that of Example 2.) This example demonstrates the structure in Figure   4 (c).
Numerical analysis
In this section we examine the market value of different electricity storage facilities by applying the optimal policy established in §4, in conjunction with an electricity price model from the literature (Zhou et al. 2013 ). We first discuss in §5.1 the electricity price model we use; we then discuss our numerical results in §5.2.
Calibrated price model
We summarize the price model and its calibration from Zhou et al. (2013) . As discussed in Zhou et al. (2013) , a model of electricity price evolution should capture three salient features: mean reversion, a tendency to revert back to the mean price level; jumps, sudden steep departures from normal price levels; and seasonality, a general term used to describe any repeated pattern of electricity prices at any time scale. Specifically, Zhou et al. (2013) modify one of the price models in Lucia and Schwartz (2002) to represent the electricity price p t for each period t as follows:
here ξ t is a mean reverting process; f (t) a seasonality process; and J t a jump process. These authors assume that ξ t is a mean-reverting process with zero mean-reversion level as follows:
where κ is the mean-reverting rate; σ the constant volatility; and dZ t a standard Brownian motion increment. In Zhou et al. (2013) , the jump component J t is a compound Bernoulli process:
J t = jump size · {1, a jump with probability λ; 0, no jump with probability 1 − λ}, where the jump size follows an empirical distribution, derived from data. Notice that J t does not appear in the mean reverting process in (11), which means that a jump lasts for only one period. We experimented with different jump arrival probabilities for different months to capture "volatility clustering" (Mandelbrot 1963 ) in a limited fashion and found that results remain qualitatively similar. We therefore report results only for constant λ.
We use the same seasonality component as in Zhou et al. (2013) , except that the period length in Zhou et al. (2013) is one hour, while the period length in our paper is eight hours (we call it a "block;" block 1: 00:00-8:00; block 2: 8:00-16:00; block 3: 16:00-00:00). As we discuss next in §5.2, eight hours is a typical duration for a battery to be charged/discharged in full (Eyer and Corey 2010) . The use of these blocks allows us to ignore flow rate constraints, simplifying our analysis. Table 1 Jump size distribution. Table 2 Estimated parameters for the mean reversion, seasonality, and jump model. Specifically, the seasonality model that we use is a deterministic function as follows:
Mean Reversion
where A is the constant level; µ · t captures a trend; γ 1 · D 1 t captures the non-business day effect, with γ 1 the magnitude of the effect, and D 1 t a dummy variable that equals one if the current period is a non-business day (holiday or weekend), and zero otherwise; γ 2i (i = 1, · · · , 11) and γ 3j (j = 1, 2) represent the seasonality of month i and block j, respectively; and D 2i t (i = 1, · · · , 11) and D 3j t (j = 1, 2) are dummy variables that equal one if period t is in month i and block j, respectively.
We calibrate this price model using the same method in Zhou et al. (2013) to price data from NYISO in the zone for New York City from 2005-2008; we summarize the results in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The mean absolute error from the regression in this calibration is 13.88 ($/MWh), while the mean of this price series is 85.16 ($/MWh). We use these parameter estimates in our numerical study.
Numerical results
In the ensuing analysis, we focus on industrial batteries with an energy capacity of 8 MWh that can be fully charged/discharged within eight hours (these are standard parameters, see Eyer and
Corey 2010). Thus we set eight hours as the length of each period, consistent with our price model. We vary r by varying α, β, and η: α and β can be any number in (0,1]; η is chosen from the set {1, 0.99989, 0.99967, 0.99945}, which corresponds to the self-discharge rate over a month of 0% for a sodium sulfur battery, 1% for a lead acid battery, 3% for a nickel-cadmium battery, and 5% for a nickelmetal hydride battery, respectively (EPRI 2004).
To solve our MDP, we use backward dynamic programming. To compute the optimal action for each state in each period t, we leverage the optimal policy structure obtained in §4. Assuming that the battery starts empty, according to Proposition 2, the possible inventory levels visited by an optimal policy in period t are 0, η, . . . , η t−1 . Thus, for each period t we only need to compute the value functions at these inventory levels. In addition, we discretize the mean reversion process as a trinomial lattice based on the method in Jaillet et al. (2004) . The state variable for each stage in our MDP is the discretized triple (inventory level, mean reversion level, jump size), so the number of factors in the price model n equals 2.
We solve the MDP in (2) for a horizon of one year with three periods per day, so the total number of periods (stages) is 365 · 3 = 1, 095 periods. The discount factor δ for each stage is 0.99999, corresponding to an annual risk-free interest rate of 1% with continuous compounding (recall that we use risk-neutral valuation, but we assume a zero market price of risk). If the electricity price is strictly positive, then we would expect the total value to increase as the storage facility becomes more efficient, that is, as the round-trip efficiency r grows. As seen in Figure 8 , this is the case for r ≥ 0.1, but it is not true in general, due to the presence of negative prices. This non-monotonicity illustrates Proposition 3. In Figure 8 , we assume β = η = 1 and vary α, so the round-trip efficiency r equals α. We repeated this experiment for different β and η values, and found the same non-monotonic phenomenon as we vary α. Value for r = 1 and r = 0.005 at different price intervals.
This non-monotonicity results from negative prices combined with low round-trip efficiencies:
The greater the loss in charging, the more electricity is needed to fill up a battery, and the more value the merchant can obtain by buying electricity at a negative price. Thus, an inefficient battery creates market value primarily by destroying electricity surpluses when purchasing them at negative prices. This is in stark contrast to an efficient battery, which creates market value by storing electricity surpluses.
We compare the value breakdown of a perfect battery (r = 1, solid bars) and an inefficient one (r = 0.005, grey bars) over different price intervals in Figure 9 . Each bar represents the total To further demonstrate the different approaches of optimally managing a perfect battery and an inefficient one, we plot the total quantity sold and bought at different price intervals in Figures 10 and 11, respectively. These figures indicate that a perfect battery sells much more than an inefficient one; the former typically buys at low positive price intervals, from [0$/MWh, 100$/MWh] (it also infrequently buys at negative prices, though this is not apparent from Figure 11 ), and the latter buys predominately at negative prices (it also buys at extremely low positive prices, though almost never and thus not apparent in Figure 11 ).
Our experiments show that the value of a battery with round-trip efficiency 0.005 exceeds that of a perfect battery, suggesting that destroying electricity surpluses with an extremely inefficient storage facility, or even a load bank (a device that acts as an electrical load to consume power) may be more valuable than storing surpluses using a battery with high performance. The advantage of the disposal strategy over the storage strategy may be even more substantial in markets such as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT 2008) and the European Energy Exchange (Nicolosi 2010 , Brandstätt et al. 2011 , which exhibit larger and more frequent negative prices.
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the jump arrival rate, that is, we examine how the value of both strategies would change with higher jump arrival rates (which imply higher probability of negative prices). We find that the values of both strategies increase almost linearly in the jump arrival rate, but the slope of the increase of the disposal strategy is about five times larger than the slope of the storage strategy. This further implies that the disposal strategy is more reliant on jumps (or more specifically, negative prices) to generate value, and also that the disposal strategy may become more relevant in the future, given that negative prices are expected to become more frequent.
5.2.2.
Value lost in ignoring negative prices. We proved in §4 that the existence of negative prices can change the optimal inventory policy from Charnes et al. (1966) to that shown in Proposition 2. But it remains unknown how much value is lost if one ignores negative prices and assumes the policy from Charnes et al. (1966) is optimal. To establish this, we compare the optimal values in Figure 8 with the values obtained when we ignore negative prices in determining our operating policy. To compute the latter, we first construct a price model that ignores negative prices (denoted by M'), then obtain its corresponding optimal action, and finally apply these actions to the MDP using the original price model (denoted by M). We construct price model M' from M by truncating any negative p t in the immediate payoff function in the MDP (2) to zero.
We compare these two sets of values for different round-trip efficiencies in Figure 12 . This figure
shows that the value of the storage strategy (r = 1) does not change much if we ignore negative Figure 12 Comparing the values at different round-trip efficiencies for both the cases considering and ignoring negative prices prices. However, the value of the disposal strategy (r = 0.005) decreases significantly: from $180, 412
to $121, 391, a decrease of around 32.7%. This is not surprising given Figures 10 and 11: since the value of the storage strategy stems mainly from sales at positive prices, this value would not be far off even if negative prices are ignored. But since the value of the disposal strategy comes mainly from purchases at negative prices, this value may drop considerably if we ignore negative prices.
Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical observation that electricity prices can be negative, we investigate whether it is more valuable for merchants to manage electricity surpluses by storing them or destroying them. We evaluate these two strategies by considering a storage facility with different round-trip efficiencies: a high round-trip efficiency corresponding to the storage strategy, and a low round-trip efficiency to the disposal strategy. We model this problem as an MDP and derive its optimal policy structure, which generalizes a classic result by Charnes et al. (1966) and which differs significantly from typical threshold policies in the literature. We apply our optimal policy to data and find that the disposal strategy may have even more value for a merchant than the storage strategy. In addition, we find that the value of the storage strategy arises from purchasing electricity primarily at low positive prices and reselling the stored electricity at higher prices, whereas the disposal strategy generates value primarily by buying electricity at negative prices and destroying it.
While the storage strategy is common in most commodity markets, the disposal strategy is relatively rare. A type of disposal can be found in the practice of hydro spill: during rainy seasons, excess water in a dam may be spilled to satisfy environmental or irrigation requirements (Ikura and Gross 1984 , BPA 2010 . However, our analysis shows that there is potentially hidden value in this practice, as pumping and spilling water could be used as a method to destroy electricity. As wind penetration increases and negative prices become more common, the disposal strategy may become more common as well.
Other than providing guidelines on the management of electricity surpluses on the firm level, our results also raise awareness of issues potentially relevant on the societal and policy level. First, the Production Tax Credit (DSIRE 2011) may ultimately need to be modified to promote generating wind energy only when it is needed. Currently, this subsidy may lead to more negative prices, and hence may encourage wind energy generated due to the subsidy to be destroyed. Second, assuming that conserving (storing) energy is preferable to destroying it from a societal perspective, government policies may need to be devised to induce use of the storage strategy. Without them, our results show that a merchant's profit-maximization may lead to an undesired outcome-more disposal than storage. However, this assumption may not necessarily hold; it is possible that disposal is better than storage for society. Answering this intriguing question may require an equilibrium model, which is one of many future research directions.
Our results are limited in the following ways. First, we assume that the merchant makes a decision every eight hours, a period long enough to fully charge/discharge a storage facility without significantly shortening its life expectancy. In reality, however, these trading decisions can be made more frequently, for instance every hour, during which charging/discharging may not have been completed. If such decisions are permitted, flow rate constraints would have to be added to our model. Second, in comparing the values of the disposal and storage strategies we assume that the facilities (including power electronics) used to implement these two strategies already exist, and we thus ignore capital costs. If these facilities need to be developed, then these costs would have to be included in our analysis. The main difficulty here would be gathering data on the cost of a device to destroy electricity, such as an extremely inefficient battery or, alternatively, a load bank.
We prove convexity by induction. For t = T + 1, V T +1 (x T +1 , p T +1 ) = 0, so the hypothesis holds. Suppose it holds for any t = k + 1, · · · , T , then V k+1 (x k+1 , p k+1 ) in (3) is finite and convex in x k+1 given any p k+1 .
For t = k, E k [V k+1 (y k , p k+1 )] is also finite as E k [|p k+1 |] is finite, and convex in y k given any x k and p k as expectation preserves convexity. Therefore given p k , the objective function in (4) is finite and convex in y k over [0, x k η], thus the optimal y k for (4) can be either 0 or ηx k ; similarly, the optimal y k for (5) can be either ηx k or η. So an optimal solution to (3) must reside at one of the three candidate points: 0, ηx k , η (define the set of these three points as Y ). Denote the objective function in (3) by u k (x k , y k , p k ), thus
We show that the functions u k (x k , y k , p k ) for each y k ∈ Y are finite and convex in x k , for any given p k :
which is finite and linear in x k given any p k .
(ii) u k (x k , x k η, p k ) = δE k [V k+1 (ηx k , p k+1 )], which is convex in x k because E k [V k+1 (y k , p k+1 )] is convex in y k for given p k and x k = y k /η.
, finite and linear in x k given any p k .
So V k (x k , p k ) is the maximum of three functions which are convex over a convex set X for each action in Y given any p k . Since Y is a nonempty finite set, by Proposition A-3 in Porteus (2002) , V k (x k , p k ) is also convex in x k given any p k . Additionally, V k (x k , p k ) is finite because all three functions are finite.
Therefore, for any t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1}, V t (x t , p t ) is finite and convex in x t given any p t ∈ P t .
